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De-globalization and De-coupling: Game Changing Consequences? 
 
Michael Witt, Peter Ping Li, Liisa Valikangas and Arie Y. Lewin 
 
（Management and Organization Review, 17:1: 6-15） 
The antecedents of de-globalization can be traced to the reemergence of China and its entry 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In the years that followed, China 
experienced a massive expansion in international trade and foreign direct investment as well 
as strong economic development, with average growth in its gross domestic product (GDP) 
of more than 9% between 2001 and 2019 (World Bank, 2021). However, China has also 
adroitly exploited weaknesses in the world trade regime, which permitted it to avoid adhering 
to policies and practices on which the organization was founded and to which it was 
committed (Jannace & Tiffany, 2019). The resulting imbalance in international trade and the 
failure of leading economists to foresee the attendant steep decline in manufacturing jobs in 
the US (Krugman 2018, 2019; Petricevic & Teece, 2019) gave rise to sentiments opposing 
globalization, which in turn facilitated the election of President Donald Trump and 
accentuated his de-globalization policies. The COVID-19 pan- demic – a black swan-type 
event in terms of its catastrophic consequences that was surprising despite the predictions of 
such a health crisis – triggered a separate and independent strategic reevaluation of global 
value chains (GVCs) as a critical element of both international trade and foreign direct 
investment.  
In this context, this MOR Special Forum invited commentaries on two broad questions:  
1. What are the most salient contextual forces driving the trend toward de-globalization 
and global decoupling (e.g., geopolitical conflicts, GVCs or global supply chains, 
reshoring and relocation of manufacturing hubs, software development, electronic 
payment, platformization, and ecosystems)?  
2. How can multinational enterprises (MNEs) headquartered in liberal democracies or 
state capitalist systems best adapt and respond to these emerging dynamics?  
The first collection of commentaries features selections from the first wave of submissions, 
of which MOR received 27.  
De-globalization has attracted growing attention across economics, political science, 
international business, and strategic management. It has also been of interest to scholars 
studying technological revolutions that affect manufacturing (e.g., three-dimensional 
printing, robotics, and digital transformation) as well as platformization and ecosystems that 
affect the reorganization of business sectors, such as hospitality, retail, fintech, and the 
sharing economy (e.g., Uber and the gig economy). However, it is extremely challenging to 
theorize about the emerging trends and directions of change or possible outcomes in these 
complex contexts. To provide firmer conceptual grounding for the debate, we therefore offer 
a coevolutionary framework in this introduction to make sense of imaginable scenarios and 
potential consequences.  
Figure 1 provides a bird’s-eye view of the coevolutionary complexity that will shape the 
future, especially the interdependencies of different layers of embedded- ness of the firm 
including international institutions (e.g., WTO), nation states, and industries and the impact 
 2 
of external factors. At the core, a coevolutionary perspec- tive is central for tracking and 
evaluating the complex dynamics of change (Ilinitch, D’Aveni & Lewin, 1996; Lewin & 
Volberda, 1999; Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). Volberda and 
Lewin (2003) argued that organizational changes involve the complex, reciprocal, and 
iterative interaction of forces within the organization, its competitive environment, its formal 
and informal institutional environment, and the larger social, political, and technological 
environment in which firms are embedded, as summarized in Figure 1. To the extent that the 
enterprise or a sector experiences a radical environmental change with a material impact on 
its viability, adaptive processes at multiple levels will be triggered. Given growing volatility, 
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, unpredictable and potentially far-reaching solutions 
and innovations will emerge from many directions and individuals (e.g., March & Olsen, 
1976). Organizations will pursue varying strategies (variation), of which only some will 
prove successful or acceptable (selection). As knowledge about successful adaptations 
spreads through an industry sector or an economy, the solutions are increasingly adopted 
through isomorphic processes (retention).  
From a coevolutionary perspective, de-globalization and COVID-19 intro- duce potentially 
disruptive and far-reaching swings into the social, political, and technological environment. It 
is possible that organizations can accommodate these swings within the existing structures 
and processes or with minor tinkering. However, if these developments, whether black swan-
like or not, induce major qualitative changes in international business (e.g., Witt, 2019b), 
international and national institutions, industries, and enterprises are likely to come under 
major pressure to adapt.  
In the organizational context of the MNE, a wide range of structures and processes may thus 
be thrown into question. For instance, it seems likely that political pressures attendant to de-
globalization and COVID-19 might deprive the global factory (Buckley, 2011) of part of its 
ability to ‘fine-slice’ its GVCs. What will be the key characteristics of the resultant 
reconfiguration? For example, what adaptations are required by the changed conditions for 
making value chain location choices and determining governance modes? How much and 
what kinds of pro- duction are relocated, nearshored, or reshored? What contingencies 
mediate these responses and their time horizons?  
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Figure 1. Co-evolution framework for theorizing consequences of de-globalization and 
decoupling Source: Adapted from Lewin et al., 2004  
Similarly, given the distinct possibility of decoupling between China and the United States, 
and possibly the West more broadly, how will organizational forms and principles adapt to 
the growing challenge of doing business on both sides of the divide? For example, will 
greater decentralization and attendant localization become a new normal to avoid close 
association with the “other” camp? Alternatively, will higher uncertainty and concomitant 
increases in transaction costs lead to stronger internalization of organizational activities? To 
what extent are network forms of organization, such as alliances, viable risk-mitigation 
strategies? And is there still, or again, a role for regional headquarters in maintaining 
organizational cohesion in a divided world?  
An important implication of the coevolutionary view is not only that organizations are likely 
to face adaptation pressure because of a changing macroenvironment but also that 
organizations in different countries will respond in distinct ways. The impact of de-
globalization and COVID-19 on organizations will be mediated by national institutional 
systems, enabling some kinds of adaptive responses while discouraging others (see Hall & 
Soskice, 2001). MOR as a journal has a long-standing interest in these national variations, 
especially with respect to the impact of the Chinese institutional context on organizational 
responses but also more widely in the context of emerging market contexts compared with 
the advanced industrialized countries, where most extant organizational research and theories 
have evolved.  
This suggests a range of salient questions. For example, how does the national context 
codetermine and coevolve with organizational responses to de-globalization and COVID-19, 
whether in China or any other emerging markets? And how do these responses compare to 
those by advanced industrialized countries? Recent advances in research on global 
institutional systems (e.g., Witt, Kabbach de Castro, Amaeshi, Mahroum, Bohle, & Saez, 
2018) may be instrumental in decomposing these questions. These effects may then further 
interact with industry- and organizational-level factors, suggesting that research in this vein 
may be particularly amenable to configurational research methodologies capable of handling 
complex patterns of causality, such as fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (Fainshmidt, 
Witt, Aguilera, & Verbeke, 2020; Greckhamer, Furnari, Fiss, & Aguilera, 2018).  
The initial collection of commentaries in this MOR Special Forum contributes to the 
discussion on these questions from various perspectives. Specifically, in his commentary, 
Peter Buckley (2021) discusses the possibility of the rise of new kinds of cartel forms built 
around firms or industrial sectors that share GVCs or sourcing locations. Technically, this 
might involve building platforms similar to Airbnb or Amazon, which connect manufacturers 
within a sector to a customized global supply chain that can accommodate sourcing 
redundancies or exclude suppliers in certain countries (e.g., Kenney & Zysman, 2020).  
The commentary by Farok Contractor (2021) advances the argument that US manufacturing 
decline in manufacturing output relative to GDP resulted from automation, rather than 
globalization. Elizabeth Rose (2021), however, observes that data on US manufacturing are 
distorted by the outlier performance of the information and communications technology 
sector, because the statistics on it are included in those for manufacturing as a whole. In 
essence, after the statistics on the computer industry are excluded from those on US 
manufacturing, the decline in jobs cannot be explained by investment in automation. This 
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highlights the issue of the domain and interpretation of data when discussing globalization 
and its impacts. Moreover, Krugman (2018, 2019) has recognized that the impact of China’s 
rapid development, following its membership in the WTO in 2001, was unforeseen by many 
economists (including himself) in the 1990s and that the emergence of China as the world’s 
factory contributed to the loss of jobs in US manufacturing.  
The contributions by Farok Contractor and Elizabeth Rose provide a good starting point for a 
multidimensional discussion on the coevolution of organizational strategy embedded in its 
institutional context, ideally based on internationally comparative data. For example, as 
Contractor pointed out, US manufacturing declined 30% in terms of its proportion of GDP, 
from around 16% in 1997 to around 11% in 2018 (World Bank, 2021). However, this is not a 
universal pattern. Table 1 displays comparative data for five countries, each of which is the 
leading exponent of its respective type of capitalism (Witt et al., 2018). The decline in France 
is similar to that in the United States, but the drop in Japan is much smaller. Germany 
effectively has no change, and South Korea experienced a small increase. What differentiates 
these countries?  
Are these countries experiencing globalization differently? As shown in Table 1, those 
economies that maintained higher levels of manufacturing value added also increased their 
proportion of exports over GDP the most, with a positive correlation of 0.70. Of course, this 
does not control for other explanatory variables, but it does at least raise the possibility that 
globalization may be beneficial, rather than harmful (as conventional wisdom would 
suggest), to manufacturing in advanced industrialized economies. To the extent that this is the 
case, it is important to explore which factors best explain how and why countries can take 
advantage of globalization through exports.  
Table 1. Comparative Statistics 
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Automation might play an important role. Table 1 shows the robotics density in 
manufacturing in the five economies. It is clear that manufacturing has held up much better in 
economies with higher levels of automation (correlation: +0.88). This is consistent with the 
argument that offshoring and automation are substitutes (Antràs, 2020). Why are some 
societies more open to automation than others? For example, what is it about Advanced 
Northeast Asian capitalism, of which South Korea is the prime exemplar, that embraces the 
adoption of automation? Conversely, why are Liberal Market and European Peripheral 
Economies – the United States and France – seemingly resistant to automation?  
To the extent that labor relations play a role, as Contractor suggests, its role does not seem to 
be straightforward. As Table 1 indicates, the proportion of employment in manufacturing has 
declined to a similar degree across the five countries, and the US actually performed much 
better on this dimension than the conventional wisdom would suggest (lending partial support 
to Contractor’s argument that US manufacturing has held up well in terms of employment). 
This measure correlates moderately (0.49) with robotic density, raising the possibility that 
societies that retained more employment in manufacturing might not be the ones that held 
back on automation but, rather, embraced it. This is consistent with the notion that 
automation and offshoring, usually seen as implying job losses, are substitutes. However, 
Table 1 also indicates that these proportions are inversely related to the density of 
unionization (r = -0.42) In other words, societies with lower levels of organized labor seem to 
have preserved more manufacturing jobs. To the extent these patterns are replicated in larger 
samples, what mechanisms lead to this counterintuitive result?  
Arjen van Witteloostuijn (2021), in his commentary, considers the dual effects of the 
globalization of both capital and labor. He expects the globalization of capital to reinforce 
and accelerate historical trends of substituting capital for labor (e.g., automation, robotics), 
which are the prerequisites for implementing cost-effective reshoring or nearshoring of 
manufacturing. The globalization of capital under this scenario has several consequences, all 
of them negative for labor. The overall effect of the fourth industrial revolution is to further 
decrease the demand for manufacturing jobs by unionized labor. Combined with the new 
phenomenon of working from home (WHM), companies will accelerate the shift away from 
employees going to work in a fixed office location. Companies will increasingly turn these 
WHM employees to on-demand entrepreneurs, whose long-term prospects will depend on 
their ability to engage in long-term learning and upgrading of their digital skills. Van 
Witteloostuijn also expects workers in the Anglo-Saxon countries (the UK and the US) to be 
affected more negatively because of the sizable availability of English-speaking talent in 
many countries around the world who could compete for the new WFH opportunities and 
who are also digitally savvy.  
A central argument in Peter Williamson’s (2021) commentary is that decoupling and de-
globalization are ultimately irrational objectives, whose pursuit would stifle innovation, 
increase costs, and close off profitable opportunities. Firms consequently have an economic 
incentive to resist political pressure against globalization. However, economic forces are only 
one dimension that influences organizational strategies, as suggested by the coevolutionary 
framework. Firms are embedded in multiple levels that both shape and are shaped by 
organizational activity as well as by many other factors. To us, the role of politics looks both 
singularly relevant and underexplored in the International Business (IB) literature. This 
introduces an opportunity for advancing counterarguments on de-globalization and 
decoupling.  
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In political science, liberalism and realism are the two major paradigms that explain 
globalization and de-globalization. The dominant paradigm in political science is realism – 
and yet virtually all contributions on de-globalization and decoupling in IB have effectively 
ignored its analytical position and implications for company strategies. As discussed by Witt 
(2019a), realism sees the world in terms of a struggle for survival by sovereign nation-states 
in a context of global anarchy. To increase their chances of survival in the face of potential 
aggression from other states, countries must maximize their military and economic power 
relative to other states. Globalization endures where a global superpower has the ability to 
coerce all other states to play by its rules in the world economy. With the decline of this 
superpower, or hegemon, and the concomitant rise in power of a rival state, globalization 
gives way to de-globalization because the incumbent hegemon lacks the power to enforce the 
rules of the game.  
In the present context, the US is a declining hegemon that led the creation of the institutional 
infrastructure of the world economy that is now being challenged by a rising China. The main 
prescription offered by realism is that, for the sake of its own sovereignty and survival, the 
US must do whatever it can to prevent China from gaining global hegemony. Short of a 
preemptive war, it can do so in three ways: (1) weaken China, (2) strengthen the US (Trump 
emphasized this), (3) seek and strengthen allies against China (failure to pursue this was the 
biggest shortcoming of Trump’s foreign policy).  
The main objective of decoupling is to weaken China by cutting it off from inputs that the 
country needs for sustaining its economic growth and military power, ideally in collaboration 
with other major countries. Depriving China as a whole or its leading companies of crucial 
inputs, such as semiconductors, is one route. Preventing Chinese nationals from gaining 
advanced degrees related to sensitive technologies or shutting down scientific collaboration 
in high-technology sectors in which the US is leading is another route. Preventing Chinese 
MNEs from making acquisitions in the West that could enable them to springboard techno- 
logically and scientifically is a third. Closing export markets for Chinese firms (e.g., Huawei) 
is a fourth.  
Decoupling and attendant de-globalization imply an economic cost for the US. Under 
realism, however, what counts is relative power, not absolute power. As long as these 
measures hurt China more than the US, under realist logic, they make perfect sense. 
Ultimately, what is at stake is the right to self-determination and possibly even survival. The 
US does not want to see China emerge as its overlord. Indeed, the trade wars at least seem to 
affect Chinese GDP more than US GDP (The Economist, 2019). Analogously, it would be 
logical for US allies to accept the economic losses needed to contain China. It is true that the 
US has not shied from using its power, economic and military, and not always legally. But it 
has been more rules bound and predictable than China. It seems unlikely that Western 
countries would fare better with China than with the US.  
Realism is ultimately about the ethical imperative of protecting your people, and their 
preferred way of life – a dimension entirely missing from the IB discourse on decoupling and 
de-globalization. In our view, exploration of the normative pressures on and ethical 
expectations of firms await scholarly attention. Most firms today profess that they care about 
acting in socially responsible ways. What does this imply in the present political context? For 
instance, is it ethical or socially responsible to exploit regulatory loopholes to circumvent 
restrictions on doing business with Chinese companies?  
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Economically, the central question is what Western societies are willing to pay to preserve 
their way of life. Europeans forgo about six weeks of economic output each year for 
vacations and another two weeks for public holidays (clearly a lifestyle perk). This implies a 
loss of 8.3 to 12 percent of GDP annually compared with many other countries, which have 
two to four weeks of vacations and holidays. It is intriguing to consider whether Western 
societies might find it acceptable to bear a similar cost to preserve their current way of life. 
Some of this cost will have to be borne by companies, which could lose much or all of their 
business in China. Williamson argues that this will allow China to pull ahead of the West, 
citing the example of semiconductors. We think that this issue deserves further and deeper 
exploration and debate. Is decoupling really an own goal? For example, since China has 
made clear its intentions to lead the world in all aspects of high technology and has put the 
weight of the Chinese state behind this, how likely is it that other countries’ high-tech firms 
will stand a chance against Chinese competitors in the medium to long term without state 
protection and support? Might decoupling save, rather than doom, Western companies?  
CONCLUSION  
The upsurge in anti-globalization sentiments, combined with the predictable yet still shocking 
COVID-19 pandemic – a black swan-type event in terms of its catastrophic consequences – 
has triggered a strategic reevaluation of the status of globalization, including both 
international trade and direct foreign investment. The emergent predicament shaped by these 
two developments demand a fundamental rethinking of the institutional configurations that 
underpin international business activities. The geopolitical uncertainty that results from the 
clash between the current hegemon and its challenger have no direct precedent in recent 
history, with de-globalization and subsequent war in the 1930s and 1940s offering the closest 
– and most distinctly disconcerting – parallel. We believe that the coevolutionary perspective 
offered in this introduction may be helpful in making sense of imaginable scenarios and their 
potential consequences.  
NOTE  
Peter Ping Li acknowledges financial support from NSFC Grant 71732007.  
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